Philosophical Doubts about reality.

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.7336/academicus.2023.28.13

Abstract

There are many pragmatisms, and it is a little misleading to present this variegated trend of thought as if it were a monolithic doctrine. The founding fathers, too, were all but unanimous. Peirce was not in agreement with James on many issues. Dewey, in turn, did not like various aspects of both Peirce’s and James’ philosophy, while C.I. Lewis’ views on logic were quite different from those held by Dewey. It should not be surprising, then, to find the same amount of disagreement in contemporary neo-pragmatism, where Rescher and Rorty, who both define themselves pragmatists, display different opinions on most subjects. I shall draw some comparisons between the ideas of these two thinkers.

Keywords:

metaphilosophy, epistemology, metaphysics, science, realism,

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References

  1. J. Dewey, Philosophy and Civilization, Capricorn Books, New York, 1963,

  2. I. Hacking, Representing and Intervening, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993.

  3. M. Michele. “Different pragmatist reactions to analytic philosophy.” New Perspectives on Pragmatism and Analytic Philosophy, edited by Rosa M. Calcaterra, Studies in Pragmatism and Values, 2011, 101-107

  4. M. Michele. Idealism and Praxis: The Philosophy of Nicholas Rescher. De Gruyter, 2008

  5. M. Michele. “Language and Idealism.” Academicus International Scientific Journal 12.23 (2021): 156-177.

  6. M. Michele. “Realism: Philosophical and Scientific.” Academicus International Scientific Journal 11.21 (2020): 53-58.

  7. N. Rescher, The Strife of Systems, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1985.

  8. R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1979

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Published

2023-07-17

How to Cite

Marsonet, M. (2023) “Philosophical Doubts about reality”., Academicus International Scientific Journal. Vlora, Albania, 14(28), pp. 219–223. doi: 10.7336/academicus.2023.28.13.