Liberal democracy: absolutist eu rule of law conditionality or pluralistic bargaining chip?

Anja  Matwijkiw; Bronik  Matwijkiw

doi:10.55312/op.v13i2.369

Autorët

Anja Matwijkiw Indiana University Northwest
Bronik Matwijkiw Southeast Missouri State University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.55312/op.v13i2.369

Abstrakti

Anëtarësimi në BE thekson vlerat. Theksi aktual është një rast i idealizmit të BE-së, i kushtëzimit më të rreptë kundrejt ideologjisë politike dhe qeverisjes. Demokracia është e barazvlershme me demokracinë liberale, por në të njëjtën kohë pluralizmi është pjesë përbërëse e kushtëzimit. Kjo ngre pyetjen në lidhje me qëllimin e manovrimit specifik për një vend ose – nëse vendet kandidate në BE dhe shtetet anëtare (shihen se) devijojnë nga një ideal i panegociueshëm – manipulim të papërshtatshëm. Ndërsa autorët nuk trajtojnë absolutizmin në vetvete, ata vazhdojnë me premisën se "perspektiva evropiane" nuk lejon çdo zbehje të vlerës, duke maksimizuar kështu konfliktin dhe krizën e identitetit që Polonia dhe Hungaria kanë shkaktuar dhe që kanë lënë në hije bisedimet e anëtarësimit për vendet kandidate. Një synim është që të kontekstualizohet debati dhe mosmarrëveshja rreth vlerave duke përfshirë njohuri ndërdisiplinore. Një tjetër është të sfidohet rrjedha (perspektiva evropiane) mbi sundimin e ligjit, ndër të tjera, me masat joliberale që Danimarka ka miratuar.

Fjalët kyçe:

kushtëzimi, anëtarësimi në BE, perspektiva europiane.

Shkarkimet

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References

(*) Acknowledgements: The authors warmly thank Stefano Busillo and Emanuele Vannata from the University of Salerno’s EUWEB Legal Observatory for his excellent research and editorial assistance. The usual disclaimer applies.

(1) In the regional context of the Balkan States, the European perspective defined in terms of “respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities” is mixed with anti-corruption and solidarity and, furthermore, a “special responsibility” to assist for the EU. See European Commission, Statement by President von der Leyen at the joint press conference with President Michel and Andrej Plenković, Prime Minister of Croatia, following the EU-Western Balkans Zagreb Summit, May 6, 2020, available at www.ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_20_825 (hereinafter 2020 Statement by President von der Leyen). For an account of stakeholder frameworks as interpretative tools, see A. MATWIJKIW, B. MATWIJKIW, A Look Behind the Legal Scene: Philosophical Stakeholder Responses

to Fundamental Human Rights, in T. RUSSO, A. ORIOLO, G. DALIA (eds.), Solidarity and Rule of Law. The New Dimension of EU Security, Springer, 2022 (forthcoming) (hereinafter A Look Behind the Legal Scene).

(2) F. FUKUYAMA, Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018.

(3) M.C. BASSIOUNI, Introduction to International Criminal Law, 2nd ed., Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013, p. 1003. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004231696

(4) F. FUKUYAMA, Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment, cit., p. 91.

(5) European Council in Action, Outcome of the Zagreb EU-Western Balkans video summit of 6 May 2020, 20 May 2021, pp. 3-4 (briefing) (hereinafter 2020 European Council in Action Briefing), available at www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/642836/EPRS_BRI(2020)642836_EN.pdf.

(6) European Commission, European Semester Thematic Factsheet, Fight Against Corruption, 22 November 2017, available at www.ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/file_import/europeansemester_ thematic-factsheet_fight-against-corruption_en_0.pdf. Note that political tyranny is the only conflict-causality that (neo-)liberals accept.

(7) Fukuyama’s position in The End of History and the Last Man, New York, Free Press, 1992 – where the globalization of western liberal democracy and free market capitalism was viewed as the culmination of the historical evolution – shifted in Trust: Social Virtues and Creation of Prosperity, New York, The Free

Press, 1995. Fukuyama conceded there is no sharp separation of culture and economics. Concerning recognition and redistribution, Fukuyama’s Identity: The Demand for Recognition and the Politics of Resentment, cit., ascribes priority to recognition. While the universal recognition that liberal democracy

implies is reshaped by narrow alternatives based on nation, religion, ethnicity, etc., recognition cannot be transcended. Populist nationalism (claimed to be rooted in economic motivation) stems from the demand for recognition (cf. idealism) and therefore cannot be satisfied by redistribution (cf. materialism).

(8) For admission, a country’s state performance and/or capacity must conform to these conditions:

• stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;

• functioning market economy and the ability to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU;

• ability to take on the obligations of membership, including the capacity to effectively implement the rules, standards and policies that make up the body of EU law (the acquis), and adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.

(9) Tension between the liberal and the “social market economy” is inescapable. See supra note 8 and infra note 66.

(10) J.S. NYE, Transformational Leadership and U.S. Grand Strategy, in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 4, 2006, p. 139. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/20032047

(11) European Parliament, A New Approach to EU Enlargement (Briefing), 2 March 2020, pp. 2-3, available at www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/649332/EPRS_BRI(2020)649332_EN.pdf.

(12) Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 2020 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, 6 October 2020, COM(2020) 660 final, available at www.ec.europa.eu/neighbourhoodenlargement/ sites/default/files/20201006-communication-on-eu-enlargement-policy_en.pdf (hereinafter 2020 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy).

(13) Ibid., pp. 1-2, 6, 14-15, 17, 19, 27; Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Enhancing the Accession Process – A Credible EU Perspective for the Western Balkans, 5 February 2020, COM(2020) 57 final, pp. 1-7, available at www.eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0057&from=EN (hereinafter Enhancing the Accession Process). For the six policy clusters (the rule of law, the internal market, competitiveness and inclusive growth, green agenda and sustainable connectivity, resources,

agriculture, and cohesion, and external relations), see id., p. 7.

(14) Enhancing the Accession Process, cit., pp. 1, 3-4.

(15) Ibid., p. 3.

(16) Ibid., pp. 1-3.

(17) “The EU is a strategic goal for us, but I will not condone anyone and speak out against China and Russia”, Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vučić stated. See A. SZUCS, T. OZTURK, Western Balkans Is ‘Priority’: EU Top Official, in Anadolu Agency, 6 May 2020, available at www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/western-balkans-is-priority-eu-top-official/1831836.

(18) 2020 Statement by President von der Leyen, cit.

(19) The fundamentals, referred to as “the rule of law cluster”, contain eight sub-categories, including “judiciary and fundamental rights”. See Enhancing the Accession Process, cit., p. 7.