Përtej njohjes të ndërsjelltë: rregullat e ekipeve të përbashkëta të hetimit

Autorët

  • Rosa Maria Geraci Universiteti i Romës “Tor Vergata”

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.55312/op.v13i2.378

Abstrakti

“Ekipet e Përbashkëta të Hetimit” (EPH) janë një mjet i ri efektiv për bashkëpunim në çështjet penale, bazuar në një “shpirt solidariteti” në kryerjen e hetimeve penale ndërkufitare, formave sinergjike të bashkëpunimit mes autoriteteve gjyqësore dhe
policore të vendeve anëtare (apo vendeve jo-anëtare të BE-së, nëse ekzistojnë bazat ligjore), që koordinojnë veprimet e tyre dhe ndajnë rezultatin e arritur. EPH përbëjnë një formë të paprecedentë të asistencës ligjore: “joletërporositëse”, “hibride”, “operacionale” dhe “e vetëmjaftueshme” nga një pikëpamje organizative. Bazuar në një marrëveshje mes autoriteteve kompetente – si ato gjyqësore (gjykatës, prokurorë, gjykatës hetimor) por edhe ato policore - të dy apo më shumë shteteve, EPH-të janë krijuar për një kohëzgjatje të kufizuar dhe për një qëllim specifik për të kryer hetime penale në një apo më shumë shtete të përfshira.
Pavarësisht avantazheve të shumta, çështjet kritike nuk janë pak: balanca mes luftës kundër krimit ndërkombëtar dhe të drejtës për mbrojtje; mungesa e masave të duhura për përafrimin me të drejtën penale të vendeve anëtare të BE-së dhe problemet që hasen në pranimin e provave të mbledhura në vende të tjera në gjykatat kombëtare; ndërveprimet me mjete të tjera të reja bashkëpnimi, (MAE, EIO, etj.), në lidhje me të ciliate EPH-të mund të veprojnë shpesh si një mekanizëm iniciues për një aktivitet hetimor që mund të zhvillohet më gjërë.

Fjalët kyçe:

Eurojust, Europol, Ekipe të Përbashkëta Hetimi, bashkëpunimi gjyqësor në Çështje Penale, njohje e ndërsjelltë, Olaf.

Shkarkimet

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References

(1) See A.M. COSTA, Preface, in Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment Report 2010 (www.unodc.org), p. 1; M. PERROTTI, Squadre investigative comuni in ambito euro unitario. Dalla decisione quadro alla normativa nazionale, in Diritto penale e processo, No.8, 2016, p. 1008; V.

MILITELLO, Agli albori di un diritto penale comune in Europa: il contrasto al crimine organizzato, in V. MILITELLO, L. PAOLI, J. ARNOLD (eds.), Il crimine organizzato come fenomeno transnazionale. Forme di manifestazione, prevenzione e repressione in Italia, Germania e Spagna, Milan, 2000, p. 16.

(2) All Member States have implemented one or both of these legal bases to date. See G. IUZZOLINO, Le squadre investigative comuni, in Squadre investigative e arresto europeo. Gli strumenti per la consegna ‘non estradizionale’, in Diritto & giustizia, No. 15, Special Insert, 2003, p. X ff.; F. SPIEZIA, Le linee evolutive della cooperazione giudiziaria penale in ambito europeo, in E. APRILE, F. SPIEZIA (eds.), Cooperazione giudiziaria penale nell’Unione europea prima e dopo il Trattato di Lisbona, Milan, 2009, p. 199 ff.; J. KAPPLINGHAUS, Joint Investigation Teams: Basic Ideas, Relevant Legal Instruments and First Experiences in Europe, report to the 134° International Training Course, Visiting expert’s papers, 14 April

; M. PLACHTA, Joint Investigation Teams. A New Form of International Cooperation in Criminal Matters, in European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2005, p. 284 ff.; M.C. REBECCHI, Joint Investigation Teams: A Reachable Solution to Catch Unreachable Criminals, in Queen Mary Law Journal, No. 8, 2016, pp. 95-108; C. RIJKEN, Joint Investigation Teams: Principles, Practice, and Problems. Lessons Learnt from the First Efforts to Establish a JIT, in Utrecht Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2006, p. 117; L. SALAZAR, La nuova Convenzione europea sull’assistenza giudiziaria in materia penale, in Diritto penale e processo, Vol. 6, No. 11, 2000, pp. 1535 ff. and 1664 ff.; T.

SCHALKEN, M. PRONK, On Joint Investigation Teams, Europol and Supervision of Their Joint Actions, in European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, No. 10, 2002, p. 70 ff.; T. SPAPENS, Joint Investigation Teams in the European Union: Article 13 JITS and the Alternatives, in European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2011, p. 239 ff.

(3) Legislative Decree of 15 February 2016, No. 34, containing implementing rules for Council Framework Decision 2002/465/JHA of 13 June 2002 on Joint investigation teams, in OJ of the Italian Republic No.58, of 10 March 2016. See R. BELFIORE, Le squadre investigative comuni nel decreto legislativo n. 34/2016, in Cassazione penale, No. 10, 2016, p. 3886 ff.; L. CAMALDO, Le squadre investigative comuni: la normativa di attuazione dopo una lunga attesa (d.lgs. 15 febbraio 2016, n. 34), in F. RUGGIERI (ed.), Processo penale e regole europee: atti, diritti, soggetti e decisioni, Turin, 2017, p. 17 ff.; A. CISTERNA, Squadre investigative comuni contro terrorismo e crimine operative da oggi, in Il Sole 24 Ore, 25 March

; R.M. GERACI, Le squadre investigative comuni. Uno studio introduttivo, Turin, 2017, p. 73 ff. (4) Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014, regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters, in OJ L 130 of 1 May 2014, where recital 8: “[t]he EIO should have a horizontal scope and therefore should apply to all investigative measures aimed at gathering

evidence. However, the setting up of a joint investigation team and the gathering of evidence within such a team require specific rules which are better dealt with separately. Without prejudice to the application of this Directive, existing instruments should therefore continue to apply to this type of investigative measure”. According to Eurojust, Joint Note of Eurojust and the European Judicial Network on The practical application of the European Investigation Order, June 2019, p. 16, “[g]enerally speaking, EIOs and JITs are different tools and assessment should be made on a case-by-case basis concerning which instrument is best used in which circumstance (e.g. countries involved, complexity of the case, type and number of investigative measures needed, expected costs, etc.). Sometimes, both tools can be combined and the evidence obtained by one JIT country with an outgoing EIO to a country outside the JIT can be shared within the JIT (with an explicit clause in the EIO that enables the sharing of evidence). In countries in which enforcement authorities play an important role, JITs may be the preferred option, rather than a ‘judicialised’

EIO regime”.

(5) In this case it is necessary to determine the legal basis on which the JIT agreement will be based: an international legal instrument, a bilateral agreement, a multilateral agreement, national legislation.

(6) Convention of 29 May 2000 (Brussels Convention) on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union, art. 13, para. 1; Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of

June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States - Statements made by certain Member States on the adoption of the Framework Decision, in OJ L 190 of 18 July 2002, pp. 1-20, art. 1, para. 1. In the vast majority of cases for which JITs are established, parallel investigations are ongoing in the concerned States. However, investigations may not always have been

opened in all concerned States when a JIT is considered (but only in one or several of them). In such situations, the first step is often to trigger the opening of domestic investigations in the other concerned States.

(7) JIT The WB, Guidelines on the Use of Joint Investigation Teams, p. 6, available at www.rm.coe.int/16806f720a.

(8) Council Decision 2002/187/JHA of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime, in OJ L 63 of 6 March 2002, pp. 1-13.

(9) See the updated JIT Model Agreement set out in Council Resolution 2017/C 18/01 on a Model Agreement for setting up a Joint Investigation Team (JIT), in OJ C 18 of 19 January 2017, pp. 1-9, as well as the previous models set out in Council Resolution of 26 February 2010 (2010/C 70/01), and in Council Recommendation of 8 May 2003 (2003/C 121/01). The JIT Model agreement is a common non-binding

baseline that practitioners can tailor to the specific needs of a case. It is available and can downloaded, in all official languages and in editable format, on the websites of Eurojust and Europol.

(10) M. PETROV, D. KRASTEV, Concept of Join Investigation Teams, in International E-journal of Advances in Social Sciences, Vol. 4, No. 11, August 2018, p. 426. DOI: https://doi.org/10.18769/ijasos.455669

(11) Guidelines on the use of Joint Investigation Teams, cit., pp. 9-10.

(12) JITs members must be indicated by name in the Agreement, also specifying the degree, function and possibly the authority that detaches them (Council Recommendation of 8 May 2003, cit., para. 6); this provision can be waived in the event that the team has to carry out infiltration operations or is investigating terrorist episodes that require the maximum security and it is therefore necessary to protect the identity of one or more of the its members: in this case, compatibly with the national law of State party to the agreement, it is possible to assign identification numbers to these components, which are noted in a confidential document (Council Resolution of 26 February 2010, cit., para. 7).

(13) Brussels Convention, art. 13, para. 3, let. a); Council Framework Decision 2002/465/JHA of 13 June 2002 on joint investigation teams, in OJ L 162 of 20 June 2002, pp. 1-3, art. 1, para. 3, let. a). National legislations usually specify which authority is competent to establish a JIT (where applicable, following an authorization mechanism) and which authority is competent to act as a JIT leader.

(14) Joint Investigation Team Manual, in europol.europa.eu, p. 10.

(15) See Council Resolution 2017/C 18/01, cit., para. 5; Council Resolution 2010/C 70/01, cit., para. 6; Council Recommendation 2003/C 121/01, cit., para. 5.

(16) See, L. SALAZAR, La nuova Convenzione europea, cit., p. 1665; A. MANGIARACINA, Verso nuove forme di cooperazione giudiziaria: le squadre investigative comuni, in Cassazione penale, Vol. 44, No. 6, 2004, p. 2196.

(17) See G. DE AMICIS, Il d.lgs. 15 febbraio 2016, n. 34: l’attuazione delle squadre investigative comuni nell’ordinamento italiano, in T. BENE, A. MARANDOLA (eds.), Cooperazione giudiziaria internazionale. I decreti legislativi di attuazione, Milan, 2016, p. 54; R. BELFIORE, La prova penale

raccolta all’estero, Roma, 2014, p. 168.

(18) See General Secretariat of the Council, Joint Investigation Teams Practical Guide, 14 February 2017, p. 15, available at www.eurojust.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Partners/JITs/JIT-GUIDE-2017-EN.pdf.

(19) Framework Decision 2002/465/JHA, cit. recital 9 points out that “in such cases the agreement setting up the team should specify issues relating to possible liability for such representatives”.

(20) See G. DE AMICIS, Il d.lgs. 15 febbraio 2016, n. 34: l’attuazione delle squadre investigative comuni nell’ordinamento italiano, cit., p. 53.

(21) See R. BELFIORE, La prova penale raccolta all’estero, cit., p. 170.

(22) See A. SCELLA, Verso le squadre investigative comuni: lo scenario italiano, cit., p. 145.

(23) See R.M. GERACI, Il mutuo riconoscimento nella cooperazione processuale: genesi, sviluppi, morfologie, Bari, p. 237.

(24) Framework Decision 2002/465/JHA, cit., art. 1, para. 7; Brussels Convention, cit., art. 13, para. 7.

(25) Framework Decision 2002/465/JHA, cit., art. 1, para. 9; Brussels Convention, cit., art. 13, para. 9.

(26) The Joint Investigation Teams Manual, cit., p. 11, expressly states that the purpose of this provision is to avoid the need for Rogatory Letters even when investigative measures require the exercise of coercive power, such as the execution of an arrest warrant. This is one of the main advantages of the JITs. One example is the possibility that a Dutch police officer, seconded to a team operating in Germany, asks his

colleagues in the police in the Netherlands to execute a search warrant, issued in accordance with Dutch law, in the Netherlands on behalf of the JIT. Instead, a Rogatory Letter will be activated where there is need for assistance from a Member State or a third country that does not participated in the constitution of the team: in this case, the competent authorities of the State of intervention (not the members of the JIT) will make a specific request to the competent authorities of the other State, in accordance with the relevant instruments or provisions (Brussels Convention, cit., art. 13, para. 8; Framework Decision 2002/465/JHA, cit., art. 8; see also C. RIJKEN, Joint Investigation Teams: Principles, Practice, and Problems, cit., p. 101).

(27) Framework Decision 2002/465/JHA, cit., art. 1, para. 10.

(28) R. BELFIORE, Le squadre investigative comuni nel decreto legislativo n.34/2016, cit., p. 3896.

(29) See Council Decision 2009/426/JHA of 16 December 2008 on the strengthening of Eurojust and amending Decision 2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime, in OJ L 138 of 4 June 2009, pp. 14-32, art. 9-septies; and Joint Investigation Teams Practical Guide.

cit., p. 14 (“[f]or the JIT to be eligible for Eurojust funding, Eurojust National Members of the Member

State(s) concerned must be invited to participate in its activities. The fulfilment of this requirement is

certified by ticking the corresponding box in the application form. Ideally, this invitation should be included

in specific documentation (e.g. the annex to the JIT agreement related to the role of participants, a clause

in the agreement itself or a mention included in the information supplied to Eurojust in accordance with

Article 13.5 of the Eurojust Decision, etc.)”).

(30) Framework Decision 2002/465/JHA, cit., art. 1, para. 7.

(31) Framework Decision 2002/465/JHA, cit., art. 1, para. 9.

(32) See Eurojust, Eurojust Annual Report 2020, The Hague, 2021, p. 9, available at

www.eurojust.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Documents/pdf/2021_04_14_eurojust_annual_report_2020_fin

al.pdf, which pointed out that “several measures were taken to make sure the assistance to JITs, including

funding, could remain fully available after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. The support covers the

entire life cycle of a cross-border investigation, from the planning, setting up of the JIT, and legal and

practical aid during the operational phase and the evaluation. The JITs active in 2020 focused on a wide

range of crime types, predominantly swindling and fraud, drug trafficking and money laundering”.

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Geraci, R. . (2022). Përtej njohjes të ndërsjelltë: rregullat e ekipeve të përbashkëta të hetimit. Optime, 13(2), 29–40. https://doi.org/10.55312/op.v13i2.378

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