The balkan migrant route: a eu unresolved crisis?

Teresa  Russo

doi:10.55312/op.v13i2.380

Autorët

Teresa Russo Universiteti i Salernos

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.55312/op.v13i2.380

Abstrakti

Ky artikull synon të nënvizojë se si Ballkani Perëndimor është një zonë me interes gjeostrategjik thelbësor për sigurinë brenda dhe jashtë Evropës. Rëndësia e tij gjeostrategjike u bë edhe më e dukshme që nga viti 2015, kur Ballkani Perëndimor përshkrohet nga një nga rrugët më mbresëlënëse të migratore drejt Evropës, e ashtuquajtura “rruga ballkanike”, që tregon paqëndrueshmërinë politike si të rajonit ashtu edhe të BE-së. Fluksi i madh i azilkërkuesve bëri që institucionet e BE-së të njohin në prill 2015 natyrën e jashtëzakonshme të situatës, duke kërkuar pa sukses miratimin e masave të solidaritetit për të kapërcyer situatën katastrofike humanitare në të ashtuquajturat "Shtetet Anëtare të vijës së parë". Në këtë kuadër, artikulli synon të hetojë shkurtimisht kufijtë e kuadrit rregullator ekzistues, i cili nuk ishte në gjendje të ofronte përgjigjet e duhura ndaj një situate të tillë, si dhe propozimet e Paktit të BE-së për migracionin dhe azilin, me qëllim që të gjendet një zgjidhje për një krizë që nuk është vetëm një krizë migracioni, por një krizë më e thellë identiteti që po përpiqet të balancojë interesat bashkëekzistuese të rendit juridik të BE-së.

Fjalët kyçe:

kriza e migracionit, Pakti i ri, Sistemi i Rishpërdarjes së Kuotave, solidariteti, Ballkani Perëndimor

Shkarkimet

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References

(1) See the Presidency Conclusions of Lisbon European Council of 23 and 24 March 2000: “[t]he European Council reaffirms that the peace, prosperity and stability of South East Europe are a strategic priority for the European Union”.

(2) According to F. TRAUNER, I. KRUSE, EC Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements: Implementing a New EU Security Approach in the Neighbourhood, in CEPS Working Documents, No. 290, April 2008, available at https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/ec-visa-facilitation-and-readmissionagreements- implementing-new-eu-security-approach/, these agreements between the EU and Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (ByH), Macedonia (FYROM), Montenegro and Serbia entered into force between 2006-2008, “offering speeded up visa procedures for citizens of those countries in exchange for stepped up migration cooperation, primarily aiming to curb irregular migration to the EU”.

(3) For a critical view, see N. KOGOVŠEK ŠALAMON, Asylum Systems in the Western Balkan Countries: Current Issues, in International Migration, Vol. 54, No. 6, 2016, pp. 151-163. Furthermore, the EU enlargement to the Western Balkans is marked by continued roadblocks and unjustified delays. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12273

(4) As is known, the Court of Justice stated that the Republic of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic failed to fulfil their obligations under article 5, para. 2 of Decision (EU) 2015/1523 and article 5, para. 2 of Decision (EU) 2015/1601, and have consequently failed to fulfil the subsequent relocation obligations under article 5, paras. 4 to 11 of each of those two decisions. These decisions were adopted to establish provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece on the basis of article 78, para. 3 TFEU and according to article 80 TFEU. See CJEU (Third Chamber), judgment of 2 April 2020, joined cases C-715/17, C-718/17 and C-719/17 European Commission v Republic of Poland and Others.

(5) These are Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece, in OJ L 239 of 15 September 2015, pp. 146-156; Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece, in OJ L 248 of 24 September 2015, pp. 80-94. See M. BORRACCETTI, “To Quota” or “Not to Quota”? The EU Facing Effective Solidarity in Its Asylum Policy, in Eurojus, 31 July 2015; M. DI FILIPPO, Le misure sulla ricollocazione dei richiedenti asilo adottate dall’Unione europea nel 2015: considerazioni critiche e prospettive, in Diritto, Immigrazione e Cittadinanza, No. 2, 2015, pp. 33-60; P. MORI, La decisione sulla ricollocazione delle persone bisognose di protezione internazionale: un irrituale ricorso al metodo intergovernativo?, in Il Diritto dell’Unione europea, Osservatorio europeo, September 2015; A. DI

PASCALE, Il ricollocamento: appena nato è già finito?, in Eurojus, 12 February 2016,.

(6) Article 78 TFEU, para. 3, states: “[i]n the event of one or more Member States being confronted by an emergency situation characterised by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt provisional measures for the benefit of the Member State(s) concerned. It shall act after consulting the European Parliament”.

(7) Only Decision (EU) 2015/1601 laid down, in Annexes I and II, entitled respectively “Allocations from Italy” and “Allocations from Greece”, pre-established reallocation quotas in the Member States which will then be challenged by Slovakia and Hungary. On the contrary, Decision (EU) 2015/1523 implemented the political agreement reached by the Member States in the Council Resolution of 20 July 2015.

(8) See CJEU (Grand Chamber), judgement of 6 September 2017, joined cases C-643/15 and C-647/15, Slovak Republic and Hungary v Council of the European Union, in particular paras. 302-305.

(9) See A. CIRCOLO, O. HAMUĽÁK, P. LYSINA, The Principle of Solidarity between Voluntary Commitment and Legal Constraint: Comments on the Judgment of the CJEU Union in C-643/15 and C- 647/15, in Czech Yearbook of International Law, No. 9, 2018, pp. 155-173. On the contrary, in a critical perspective, see H. LABAYLE, Solidarity Is Not a Value: Provisional Relocation of Asylum-Seekers Confirmed by the Court of Justice (6 September 2017, Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15 Slovakia and Hungary v Council), in EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, 11 September 2017.

(10) See, CJEU, Slovak Republic and Hungary v Council of the European Union , cit. supra note 8, F. CHERUBINI, La Corte di giustizia in merito alla decisione del Consiglio sulla ricollocazione: riflessioni sulla politica di asilo dell’UE, in Quaderni costituzionali, No. 4, 2017, pp. 923-926; C. FASONE, La Corte di giustizia in merito alla decisione del Consiglio sulla ricollocazione: gli effetti sui legislatori e sulle procedure (non) legislative dell’Unione, in Quaderni costituzionali, No. 4, 2017, pp. 927-930; M. MESSINA, La Corte di Giustizia afferma la validità giuridica del meccanismo provvisorio di ricollocazione obbligatoria dei richiedenti protezione internazionale. A quando la volontà di alcuni Stati membri UE di ottemperarvi?, in Ordine internazionale e diritti umani, No. 4, 2017, pp. 603-607; S. PENASA, La "relocation" delle persone richiedenti asilo: un sistema legittimo, giustificato e ... inattuato? Brevi riflessioni sulla sentenza Slovacchia e Ungheria c. Consiglio, in Diritto Pubblico Comparato ed Europeo, No. 3, 2017, p. 29; A. CIRCOLO, Il principio di solidarietà tra impegno volontario e obbligo giuridico. La pronuncia della Corte di giustizia (GS) nel caso Slovacchia e Ungheria c. Consiglio, in Diritto Pubblico Comparato ed Europeo, No. 1, 2018, pp. 197-210; L. TSOURDI, Confrontation on Relocation – The Court of Justice Endorses the Emergency Scheme for Compulsory Relocation of Asylum Seekers Within the European Union: Slovak Republic and Hungary v. Council, in Common Market Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 5, 2018, pp. 1457-1494.

(11) In this sense, see U. VILLANI, Immigrazione e principio di solidarietà, in Freedom, Security & Justice: European Legal Studies, No. 3, 2017, pp. 1-4.

(12) As is known, the Advocate General Bot delivered a different opinion. After pointing out that solidarity is surprisingly absent from the list of the first sentence of article 2 TEU of the values on which the Union is founded, he stresses that the Union promotes not only solidarity between generations but also solidarity between Member States (para. 19). Therefore, Decision (EU) 2015/1601 constitutes an expression of the

solidarity that the Treaty envisages between Member States. This solidarity “has a specific content and a binding nature” which legitimizes the contested decision, that has a strong political nature aimed at stirring the opposition on the part of Member States supporting freely consented solidarity based solely on voluntary commitments (para. 23). In his view, these appeals offered an opportunity to remember that solidarity is one of the basic values of the Union: “[t]he present actions provide me with the opportunity to recall that solidarity is among the cardinal values of the Union and is even among the foundations of the Union. How would it be possible to deepen the solidarity between the peoples of Europe and to envisage ever-closer union between those peoples, as advocated in the Preamble to the EU Treaty, without solidarity between the Member States when one of them is faced with an emergency situation? I am referring here to the quintessence of what is both the raison d’être and the objective of the European project” (para. 17). See also the reflections of M. OVÁDEK, Legal Basis and Solidarity of Provisional Measures in Slovakia & Hungary v Council, in European Database of Asylum Law, 4 December 2017.

(13) The Court recalls, among the pleas advanced by the Slovak Republic and Hungary, in para. 49 of the judgment of 6 September 2017, that: “[a]lthough the contested decision classifies these amendments as mere ‘derogations’, the distinction between a derogation and an amendment is, in the applicants’ view, artificial, since, in both cases, the effect is to exclude the application of a normative provision and, by the same token, to undermine its effectiveness”.

(14) In a critical view, H. LABAYLE, Solidarity Is Not a Value, cit., who considered that, by confirming the validity of the contested Decisions, the Court of Justice has ended up defending the Dublin system, without stimulating a structural reform.

(15) Regulation (EU) 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013, establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person, in OJ L 180 of 29 June 2013, pp. 31-59. See the reflections of M. DI FILIPPO, The Dublin Saga

and the Need to Rethink the Criteria for the Allocation of Competence in Asylum Procedures, in V. MITSILEGAS, V. MORENO-LAX, N. VAVOULA (eds.), Securitising Asylum Flows. Deflection, Criminalisation and Challenges for Human Rights, Leiden, 2020, pp. 196-235. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004396814_010

(16) According to J. BAST, Deepening Supranational Integration: Interstate Solidarity in EU Migration Law, in European Public Law, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2016, pp. 289-304, “it is already evident from this outline of the Dublin System that it was not conceived as a system of solidarity. Quite the contrary: it was established as a ‘delimitation of responsibilities without a sharing of burdens between the States. The principle of the country of first asylum is ill-suited to operate as a rule establishing solidarity within the Common European Asylum System because it cannot compensate for the uneven burdens caused by the different geographic locations and established migration patterns. Indeed, this principle intensifies these effects by making further migration within Europe more difficult”.

(17) According to E. KÜÇÜK, The Principle of Solidarity and Fairness in Sharing Responsibility: More than Window Dressing ?, in European Law Journal, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2016, pp. 448-469, the Dublin system would give rise to a constitutional violation. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/eulj.12185

(18) In general on the amendments of Dublin Regulation, see, among others, S. FRATZKE, Not Adding Up. The Fading Promise of Europe’s Dublin System, March 2015; E. BROUWER, R. SEVERIJNS, Sharing responsibility: A Proposal for a European Asylum System Based on Solidarity, in EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, 17 February 2016; F. MAIANI, The Dublin III Regulation: A New Legal Framework for a More Humane System?, in V. CHETAIL, P. DE BRUYCKER, F. MAIANI (eds.), Reforming the Common European Asylum System: The New European Refugee Law, Leiden-Boston, 2016, pp. 99-142; P. MORI, La proposta di riforma del sistema europeo comune d’asilo: verso Dublino IV?, in DOI: https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004308664_006

Eurojus, 7 September 2016; F. MUNARI, The Perfect Storm on EU Asylum Law: The Need to Rethink the Dublin Regime, in Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, No. 3, 2016, pp. 517-547; C. DI STASIO, La crisi del “Sistema Europeo Comune di Asilo” (SECA) fra inefficienze del sistema Dublino e vacuità del principio di solidarietà, in Il Diritto dell’Unione europea, No. 2, 2017, pp. 209-249; C. FAVILLI, La crisi del sistema Dublino: quali prospettive?, in M. SAVINO (a cura di), La crisi migratoria tra Italia e Unione europea: diagnosi e prospettive, Naples, 2017, pp. 279-302; M. DI FILIPPO, The Allocation of Competence in Asylum Procedures under EU Law: The Need to Take the Dublin Bull by the Horns, in Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo, No. 59, 2018, pp. 41-95; T.M. MOSCHETTA, I criteri di attribuzione delle competenze a esaminare le domande d’asilo nei recenti sviluppi dell’iter di riforma del regime di Dublino, in Federalismi.it, No. 5, 2018; D. VITIELLO, The Dublin System and Beyond: Which Way Out of the Stalemate?, in Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2018, pp. 463-480.

(19) See the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council, establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast), COM/2016/0270 final - 2016/0133 (COD), no longer in force, where the Commission confirmed: “[t]he objectives of the Dublin Regulation – to ensure quick access of asylum applicants to an asylum procedure and the examination of an application in substance by a single, clearly determined, Member State – remain valid. It is clear, however, that the Dublin system must be reformed, both to simplify it and enhance its effectiveness in practice, and to be equal to the task of dealing with situations when

Member States' asylum systems are faced with disproportionate pressure”. In a critical view, see F. MAIANI, Responsibility, Allocation and Solidarity, in P. DE BRUYCKER, M. DE SOMER, J.L. DE BROUWER (eds.), From Tampere 20 to Tampere 2.0: Towards a New European Consensus on Migration, Brussels, 2019, p. 103 ff.

(20) See the Report of Cecilia Wikström, 6 November 2017, (A8-0345/2017) and F. MAIANI, C. HRUSCHKA, The Report of the European Parliament on the Reform of the Dublin System: Certainly Bold, but Pragmatic?, in EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, 20 December 2017.

(21) In particular, the European Parliament wanted the establishment of a permanent system of allocation of quotas based on a list of preferences of the applicant (so-called bottom four). On the contrary, “(…) neither the Dublin III Regulation nor the reform proposals take into account the preferences of the asylum seekers when it comes to the host state”. So, E. KÜÇÜK, The Principle of Solidarity, cit., p. 462.

(22) See Joint Declaration of Intent on a Controlled Emergency Procedure - Voluntary Commitments by Member States for a Predictable Temporary Solidarity Mechanism, 23 September 2019.

(23) See G. MORGESE, Dublin System, «Scrooge-Like» Solidarity and the EU Law: Are There Viable Options to the Never-Ending Reform of the Dublin III Regulation?, in Diritto, Immigrazione e Cittadinanza, No. 3, 2019, pp. 85-101, in part. p. 93.

(24) Although with reference to the resettlement measures adopted by the Union in the external migration policy, see the critical considerations of S. POLI, “Flexible” Cooperation Between the European Union and Third Countries to Contain Migration Flows and the Uncertainties of “Compensation Measures”: The Case of the Resettlement of Refugees in EU Member States, in Diritto Pubblico Comparato ed Europeo online, No. 4, 2020, pp. 5272-5299, who underlines: “logic, which is State-centred, fails to appreciate what the needs of the EU as a whole are and shows little awareness and sensitivity with respect to the degree of instability and concerns coming from the Southern neighbours. Furthermore, this approach is not in line with the principle of loyal cooperation that Member States have with the EU institutions in the context of EU external relations”. See, also, N. ZAUN, States as Gatekeepers in EU Asylum Politics: Explaining the Non‐Adoption of a Refugee Quota System, in Journal of Common Market Studies. Special Issue: EU Refugee Policies and Politics in Times of Crisis, Vol. 56, No. 1, 2017, pp. 44-56. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12663

(25) In general, references concerning the Pact can include: G. CAMPESI, The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum and the Dangerous Multiplication of ‘Anomalous Zones’ for Migration Management, in ASILE Forum Contributions on the new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, 27 November 2020; J.P. CASSARINO, L. MARIN, The New Pact on Migration and Asylum: Turning European Union Territory

into a Non-Territory, in EU Law Analysis, 30 November 2020; P. DE PASQUALE, Dal Nuovo Patto per la migrazione e l’asilo a un diritto dell’emergenza dell’Unione europea: a che punto è la notte?, in Diritto Pubblico Comparato ed Europeo, No. 3, 2020, pp. V-XVI; M. FUNK, New Pact, Old Problems, in International Politics and Society, 25 September 2020; E. KARAGEORGIOU, The New Pact on Migration and Asylum: Why Pragmatism Cannot Engender Solidarity, in Nordic Journal of European Law, No. 2, 2020, pp. III-VIII; F. MAIANI, A “Fresh Start” or One More Clunker? Dublin and Solidarity in the New Pact, in EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, 20 October 2020; S. MANSERVISI, The EU’s Pact DOI: https://doi.org/10.36969/njel.v3i2.22396

on Migration and Asylum: A Tsunami of Papers but Little Waves of Change, in IAI Commentaries, No. 88, 2020, pp. 1-8; A.H. NEIDHARDT, O. SUNDBERG DIEZ, The Upcoming New Pact on Migration and Asylum: Will It Be Up to the Challenge? Discussion Paper, 29 April 2020; S. PENASA, Il Nuovo Patto e l’idea di solidarietà: principio fondativo del sistema europeo di asilo o metodo di allocazione delle responsabilità tra Stati membri?, in ADiM Blog, Analisi & Opinioni, 30 November 2020; D. ARCHIBUGI, M. CELLINI, M. VITIELLO, Refugees in the European Union: From Emergency Alarmism to Common Management, in Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 10 April 2021; G. CORNELISSE, M. RENEMAN, Border Procedures in the Commission’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum: A Case of Politics Outplaying Rationality?, in European Law Journal, 23 March 2021; M. MOUZOURAKIS, More Laws, Less Law: The European Union's New Pact on Migration and Asylum and the Fragmentation of

“Asylum Seeker” Status, in European Law Journal, 7 May 2021; F. SPINELLI, United against the Pact: The Fatal Flaws in the EU’s Plans to Reform its Asylum System, in Green European Journal, 17 March 2021.

(26) E. CODINI, M. D’ODORICO, Towards More Solidarity? Preliminary Remarks on the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, 8 October 2020, consider the Pact timid document that will likely be subject to Member States’ restrictive negotiations in the upcoming months.

(27) According to C. FAVILLI, Il patto europeo sulla migrazione e l’asilo: “c’è qualcosa di nuovo, anzi d’antico”, in Questione Giustizia, 2 October 2020, the Dublin Regulation disappears formally, but its shadow, the Dublin system, remains in substance.

(28) P. VAN WOLLEGHEM, Riformare Dublino e attivare la solidarietà: gli obiettivi del Nuovo Patto UE sulla migrazione e l’asilo, in Osservatorio sulla democrazia. Fondazione Feltrinelli, 6 October 2020, considers that the approach of the Commission aimed at gathering the consensus of the member states on the New Pact through maximum flexibility in the choice between instruments. Flexibility and equivalence between measures are essential for the success of this text.

(29) Proposal for a Regulation, on asylum and migration management, COM(2020) 610 of 23 September 2020.

(30) Proposal for a Regulation, addressing situations of crisis and force majeure in the field of migration and asylum, COM(2020) 613 of 23 September 2020.

(31) The Commission would be a solidarity promoter especially in situations of migratory pressure, although with a margin of discretion that could lead it to adopt too "accommodating" solutions, in order not to upset some states. In this sense, see G. MORGESE, La "nuova" solidarietà europea in materia di asilo e immigrazione, cit., in part. p. 35. According to A. DI PASCALE, Il nuovo patto per l’immigrazione e

l’asilo: scontentare tutti per accontentare tutti, in Eurojus, October 2020, the Pact would generally adopted a compromise approach.

(32) So P. DE PASQUALE, Il Patto per la migrazione e l’asilo: più ombre che luci, in I Post di AISDUE, II (2020), Focus “La proposta di Patto su immigrazione e asilo”, No. 1, 5 October 2020.

(33) Member States shall have to specify the type of contributions of their solidarity response plan sent to the Commission.

(34) E.M. GOŹDZIAK, I. MAIN, I.B. SUTER (eds.), Europe and the Refugee Response: A Crisis of Values?, London, 2020. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429279317

(35) On the idea of a social values’ “background”, see T. RUSSO, Articolo 2 TUE, in C. CURTI GIALDINO (dir.), Codice dell’Unione europea operativo. TUE e TFUE commentati articolo per articolo, Naples, 2012, p. 60.

(36) According to article 13, para. 1, TEU: “[t]he Union shall have an institutional framework which shall aim to promote its values, advance its objectives, serve its interests, those of its citizens and those of the Member States, and ensure the consistency, effectiveness and continuity of its policies and actions”.